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CHAPTER 6

Rethinking the 3Rs: From Whitewashing to Rights
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charlotte.blattner@gmailcom

1

Introduction: Widespread Acceptance and Regulatory Failure of
the 3Rs

Few other issues have prompted as many legislators to adopt legal instruction
on the "proper" use ofnon-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals)
in medical and scientific research. Today, the 3Rs (replacement, reduction, and
refinement of animals in scientific procedures) are globally accepted by a vast
majority of states (Blattner, 2014); and prominent international organizations,
such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (Terrestrial Animal Health
Code, 2018, Article 7(8)(3)) and the Council of Europe (Convention for the
Protection ofVertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific
Purposes, 1986, Articles 6(2), 7 and 8). Widespread acceptance of the 3Rs is a
notable achievement, since animal law is a relatively young field oflaw, and at
titudes about the human-animal relationship diverge sharply across societies.
As progressive as this established body of law appears, the rules govern
ing research on animals-especially the 3R maxim that dominate this legal
landscape-suffer from regulatory failure. First, and most importantly, de
spite widespread commitment to replace and reduce animals in research,
the number of animals used for experimental purposes worldwide is now the
same as it was in the 1980s (the number dropped in the 1990s and 2000s but
has been rising ever since; Bayne et al., 2015, p. 3; European Commission, 2013;
Taylor, 2013; Taylor et al., 2008; Taylor and Rego, 2016). Second, though the
principle of refinement demands that the severity of experiments be dimin
ished, countries are reporting a rising number of research procedures done
on animals who are forced to endure the most severe experiments (e.g., Neue
Zurcher Zeitung, 2016). There is reason to believe that refinement, which seeks
to ameliorate the conditions of animals used for a research procedure, fails to
fulfill their basic welfare needs. For example, pursuant to the United States'
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, a pig who weighs up to
50kg can be housed for up to five years on 15 square feet (o.gm2 ), without any
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access to the outside (National Research Council Institute for Laboratory Ani
mal Research, 2011). The Guide states that thereby "animals can tum around
and move freely without touching food or water troughs, have ready access to
food and water, and have sufficient space to comfortably rest away from areas
soiled by urine and feces" (p. 63). On 15 square feet, however, a pig cannot
possibly exhibit normal behavior. No human of the same weight is expected
to behave naturally in a o.gm2 elevator and certainly not for a period of five
years. Overall, this overview ofthe achievements ofthe 3Rs suggests that both
in qualitative and in quantitative terms, adopting the 3Rs has not decreased
animal suffering.
At the same time, societal demands for better protection of animals are
more common than ever before (European Commission, 2016). According to
the most recent polls, citizens are increasingly concerned about the welfare of
animals used in science and agree that more needs to be done to replace their
use (Clemence and Leaman, 2016; European Citizen's Initiative, 2016; Funk and
Rainie, 2015; Jones, 2017). Despite these demands and the reasonable doubts
they cast on the potential ofthe 3Rs to lead to the ultimate replacement ofani
mals in research (see below), the 3Rs continue to be a popular policy tool for
legislators and research facilities that use them as an example of their efforts
to ameliorate the suffering of animals in research. The worldwide acceptance
and simultaneous failure ofthe 3Rs seem to have turned the maxim, intention
ally or not, into a means of whitewashing the images of those profiting from
research vis-a-vis the public: scientists, research industries, and regulators.
In light of these developments, this chapter takes a functional-comparative
approach to scrutinize whether and how we can meet the rising societal de
mands for replacement. It specifically examines whether the 3Rs bear the po
tential of meeting this goal, and if so, what reforms are necessary, or whether
the 3Rs should instead be abrogated.

2

Abrogating the 3Rs?

The widespread acceptance of the 3Rs, alongside their simultaneous failure,
forces us to ask whether the 3Rs should be retired. In 2015, people across the Eu
ropean Union (Eu) launched the European Citizens' Initiative, Stop Vivisection,
and expressed, with over 1,150,000 signatures, their desire for a paradigm shift
away from the use of animals. The European Citizens' Initiative is a political
means at the EU level that makes it possible for 1 million citizens to participate
in developing EU strategies, by prompting the European Commission (Ee) to
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propose a legislative act. The Stop Vivisection initiative demanded the use of
animals for research purposes be abolished, which would have necessitated
abrogating Directive 2010/63/EU (European Parliament, 2010), and with it,
the 3Rs. The EC responded to the initiative by issuing a communication that
effectively ignored these demands, arguing that the Directive also had replace
ment as a long-term goal, but that animal research cannot be banned because,
"a ban [ ... ] would likely export the biomedical research and testing outside
the Eu to countries where welfare standards may be lower and more animals
may be needed to achieve the same scientific result" (European Commission,
2015, p. 3). As an alternative to the proposed abrogation, the EC promised that
it would speed up the expected progress of the 3Rs by sharing knowledge, de
veloping and validating new alternatives, strengthening enforcement, and
entering a dialogue with the scientific community, for example, by organiz
ing a conference devoted to this issue (see Holley et al., 2016, on knowledge
sharing in the EU). Undoubtedly, these steps may help to enforce Directive
2010/63/EU more effectively, but they do not respond to the criticism that
the 3Rs suffer from structural deficits that lead to the perpetuation of ani
mal use in science. In effect, the steps envisaged by the Commission, like the
3Rs as they stand, are unlikely to bring about the full replacement of animal
models.
Given these economic fears and political constraints that continue to in
form the debate on the replacement ofanimals in research, it may be more ef
fective to use the worldwide acceptance ofthe 3Rs as a foundation for working
towards a paradigm change, through a foot-in-the-door strategy. Theoretically,
the 3Rs have many advantages over other types of regulatory approaches.
They are simple and intelligible, easily understandable, and catchy. They en
joy a general application, paired with refined conceptualization (compared
to the very general objective of avoiding unnecessary animal suffering that
leaves even more room for interpretation). The 3Rs take an integrative ap
proach by incentivizing innovation, accommodating the interests of various
stakeholders, and not discrediting the purposes of research, such as finding
causes, treatments, and cures for diseases or enabling novel scientific insights.
The 3Rs consider the sentience and suffering of animals a baseline and re
spond to the needs of animals beyond physiological suffering, such as their
needs for social interaction and mental stimulation. Based on the hyp othesis
that the 3Rs are theoretically expedient, it is worth exploring the potential of
this principle to mature into a more viable concept for the future of animal
law, in particular with regard to its capacity to preempt the use of animals in
research.
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Reform Proposal 1: Reverse Hierarchy of the 3Rs

Most countries claim that a minimum number of animals should be used to
obtain scientific knowledge, but the language of the replacement principle
is regularly laxer than that of refinement. For example, in the EU, Directive
2010/63/EU determines that "Member States shall ensure that, wherever pos
sible, a scientifically satisfactory method or testing strategy, not entailing
the use of live non-human animals, shall be used instead of a procedure"
(emphasis added, European Parliament, 2010, Article 4). But given that the
Directive fails to determine the probability of possible alternatives, how ac
cessible they ought to be, and the need to invest into them, the norm fails to
incentivize researchers to divest from animal research. According to Article
13 of Directive 2010/63/EU, replacement is only necessary if alternatives are
recognized under EU law. In addition, legislators often do not necessarily
mean replacement in an absolute sense when they call for replacement mea
sures; instead, the use of seemingly less sentient animals, like rodents or fish,
are readily accepted as a form of replacement (e.g., German Animal Welfare
Act 2006, Section 7a(2)(5); India Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, Ani
mal Welfare Board of India, 1982, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1982,
Section 7(2)(e); us Guide for the Care and Use ofLaboratory Animals, National
Research Council, 2011, p. 5; Scientific Committee on Health Environmental
and Emerging Risks, SCHEER, 2017, p. 15).
This clearly runs counter to Russell and Burch's (1959) definition of replace
ment as "any scientific method employing non-sentient material" (Chapter 5)
and fails to give those animals, whose capacity to sentience is still disputed,
the benefit of the doubt (challenging the view that non-human animals lower
on the zoological scale lack sentience: Tomasik, 2014). Such lax provisions give
ample room for regulatees to avoid actual replacement, and they increase the
possibility that certain research procedures may never be replaced. Given the
lax practice in replacement and strong accentuation towards reduction and re
finement, there seems to be an implicit hierarchical understanding of the 3Rs
that gives refinement and reduction priority over replacement ( Gerritsen, 2015,
p. 38). The marginalization of replacement is especially disconcerting if one
looks at the 3Rs from an "animal use" perspective, as seen in Table 6.1.
It is this framework that allows animal researchers to discharge their du
ties under the 3Rs by engaging in refinement (and marginal reduction) alone.
The political and legal preoccupation with refinement and reduction shifts the
focus away from where it should be, i.e., on replacement. So, if we continue to
accept that legislators and institutions simply refine and marginally reduce the
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TABLE 6.1

Refinement and reduction support the use of animals for research procedures
and only replacement bears the potential of phasingout animal research in the
longterm.

Use of animals

Refinement

Reduction

+

+

Replacement

use of animal models-only replacing them "wherever practical" and thereby
conceiving themselves as fulfilling their 3R duties-we will end up perpetuat
ing the use ofanimals in experiments. Contrary to what many practice, the 3Rs
ought, however, be interpreted to mandate that replacement be given primary
consideration. As the above-mentioned polls show, citizens' opinions increas
ingly pressure legislators to come up with a workable plan to phase out the
use of animals in research, which necessitates insisting on the replacement of
animals in research (see also Goldberg and Locke, 2004). To bring about this
paradigmatic change, the 3Rs should be understood hierarchically, where the
first goal is replacement, the second reduction, and the third refinement. The
imperative for this reversal is based on a historical, teleological, and evolution
ary interpretation.
A historical interpretation of the 3Rs relies on Russell and Burch's founda
tional work on the principle. Russell and Burch, the founders ofthe 3Rs, clearly
stated that the humanitarian problem lies in the severity with which animals
encounter stress and the high number of animals affected, and that the very
purpose of the 3Rs is to tackle these (Russell and Burch, 1959, p. 93; Blattner,
2014). Russell and Burch further stated that "refinement is never enough, and
we should always seek further for reduction and if possible replacement"
(Chapter 4). Because replacement does not appear to be a priority of the 3Rs
even though it is an explicit goal of the tripartite principle, the law must give
more weight to this element when it applies the principle in the future.
A teleological interpretation also suggests that the law must reverse the hier
archy of the 3Rs. Indications of this interpretation already exist under current
legislation. The Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate
Animals used for Experimental and other Scientific Purposes states in its pre
amble that its parties are " [ r] esolved to limit the use of animals for experi
mental and other scientific purposes with the aim of replacing such use [ ... ]
in particular by seeking alternative measures and encouraging the use ofthese
alternative measures" (Council of Europe, 1986). In Directive 2010/63/EU,
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the EU expressed its wish to, "achiev[ e] the final goal of full replacement of
procedures on live animals for scientific and educational purposes" (Euro
pean Parliament, 2010, Recital 10). If we interpret the 3Rs based on these
stated purposes, replacement must be our top priority. Article 4 of Directive
2010/63/EU, which details the 3R commitments, begins by stating the duty
of replacement and, thereby, implies a reverse hierarchical understanding of
the principle, as well. Article 13 of the Directive further guides the choice
of methods in the scientific and educational use of animals and-unlike the
previous regulation, Directive 86/609/EEC (Council of the European Com
munities, 1986)-does not require replacement methods to be "reasonably,
and practically available" (Article 7(2)). Instead, replacement methods are
recognized as non-animal methods or testing strategies, even if they are not
reasonably and practically available. This wording change, strictly interpreted,
means alternatives should be required even where they are costly, have nev
er been used by the researcher, or are not available at the researcher's home
institution.
The polls introduced herein show that the global community has never
been more concerned about animals' well-being than it is today. As a conse
quence ofthis burgeoning global conscience, we are witnessing the rise of the
general principle of animal welfare, which is developing into a norm of cus
tomary international law (Bowman, Davies, and Redgwell, 2010, p. 678; Brels,
2012, p. 37; Sykes, 2014; Trent et al., 2005, p. 77). International documents and
the laws of over 60 states worldwide make clear the general moral commit
ment and the legal requirement that animals be treated humanely and spared
suffering (Blattner, 2016, pp. 304-308). The general principle of animal welfare
underlines the goal of animal protection as an intrinsic interest of animals. In
other words, the suffering of animals matters to the law because it matters to
animals (Bolliger, Richner, and Riittimann, 2011, p. 24-25, n. 14; Leondarakis,
2001, p. 29). Importantly, the general principle ofanimal welfare not only man
dates proper treatment of animals while using them; it also encompasses the
aspiration ofstates to preempt any violation oftheir intrinsic interests.
Another global principle that requires regulatory frameworks to shift empha
sis on animal replacement is the precautionary principle. The precautionary
principle commonly applies in decision-making processes and entails that,
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to
prevent damage. The prime application ofthe precautionary principle is in en
vironmental law where it covers animals who form an integral part of an eco
system (Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987;
United Nations, 1992, Article 8h, 14(1)(d); United Nations General Assembly,
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1992, Article 15; World Charter for Nature, 1982, Article 12(b)). But, as the E c
states, "in practice, [the] scope [ ofthe precautionary principle] is much wider,
and specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation indicates
that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous
effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsis
tent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community" (Commis
sion of the European Communities, 2000; see also World Health Organization,
1994, Article 5(7)). The precautionary principle demands that we err on the
side of caution to prevent dangerous effects on animal health, replacing ani
mals in research rather than regulating and, thus, perpetuating their use by
refinement and reduction. We must thus decide in favor of animals wherever
and whenever actions impair, or likely will impair, their physical and psycho
logical health and life (Gerick, 2005, p. 213; Kuhlau et al., 2011). An evolution
ary interpretation, based on the general principle of animal welfare and the
precautionary principle therefore indicates that replacement should be given
primary consideration among the 3Rs.

4

Reform Proposal 2: Qualitative Balances of Interests, Harm-Benefit
Analyses, and Proportionality Tests

Even if replacement is given absolute preference, the 3Rs are still likely to fail
because in most jurisdictions they enjoy only relative validity. Researchers do
not refine the conditions of animals, do not reduce the number of animals
used, and do not replace animals as the primary research model (even where
alternatives exist) if human interests justify that decision. The Swiss Animal
Welfare Act 2005, for example, states that "[p ] ain, suffering or harm may be
inflicted on or anxiety caused to a non-human animal only if this is unavoid
able for the purpose of the experiment" (Article 20(1)). The issue here is that
the purpose of the experiment is the only determinant in deciding whether
animal suffering is unavoidable, or so-called necessary. The suffering inflict
ed on animals during experimentation is seen as a prima facie harm, but its
justifiability-and hence its legality-is fully determined by the purpose of
the experiment. Animals' interests in not suffering, by contrast, do not enter
the judgment on necessity.
The Swiss Animal Welfare Act seems to have taken a step in the right direc
tion by further providing that animal experimentation is impermissible "if, in
relation to the anticipated gain in knowledge, it inflicts disproportionate pain,
suffering or harm [on the animal] " (emphasis added, Article 19(4)). Similar
ly, under the United Kingdom's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, the
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Animals in Science Regulation Unit will assess whether the harms caused by an
experiment are '1ustified by the expected outcome" (emphasis added, Section
5B(3)(d)). This is also the case with Article 38(1)(b) of Directive/2010/63/EU
(European Parliament, 2010). These and other laws claim that they determine
the legality ofan experiment conducted on animals not only by evaluating the
necessity of an experiment but by weighing all interests at hand. Such norms
bring to application what is sometimes known as the balance ofinterest tests,
harm-benefit analyses, or the proportionality principle.
Pursuant to these tests, animal experiments are evaluated in a two-step pro
cedure. Regulators require the purpose of an experiment to be indispensable
(final indispensability), and they require the means to achieve this end to be
indispensable (instrumental indispensability or harm-benefit analysis) (Pe
ters, 2012, p. 34ff.; e.g., German Animal Welfare Act 2006, Section 7(1)(1); Swiss
Animal Welfare Act 2005, Article 17). Final indispensability is an analysis of the
purpose and legitimacy of an experiment, which answers the if question. In
strumental indispensability, on the other hand, answers the how and largely
refers to the principle of proportionality (e.g., German Animal Welfare Act,
2006, Section 7(1)(2)). The proportionality analysis includes the elements of
suitability (means must be able to achieve desired ends), necessity (no milder
means are available to achieve the end), and proportionality strictusensu (Bol
liger and Riittimann, 2015, pp. 71-73). This final proportionality, strictu sensu
evaluation includes a duty to diligently balance interests affected by the act at
hand and conforms to the harm-benefit analysis (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015,
p. 140) but with respect to means as opposed to ends.
Let us tum to final indispensability first. Before weighing interests, decision
making bodies usually follow a system that classifies expected harms inf
licted on animals. For example, there is a five-step classification system in
Canada (Canadian Council on Animal Care, 20n), in New Zealand (New Zea
land Government, 2010, Section 2(1)), and in Israel (Kolman et al., 2014, pp.
202-203), a four-tiered scheme in Singapore (National Advisory Committee for
Laboratory Animal Research, 2004, Article 5(4)(2)(b)) and the EU (European
Parliament, 2010, Articles 15 and 16); and the Philippines has a three-step pain
categorization system (Philippines Law on the Use ofAnimals in Research, 1999,
Article 5(2)). Most ofthese classification schemes determine harm or pain lev
els based on the severity ofa procedure or its duration, or a combination ofthe
two. Article 15 of Directive 2010/63/EU, for example, assesses projects as non
recovery, mild (short-term mild pain, suffering, or distress), moderate (short
term moderate or long-lasting mild pain, suffering, or distress), and severe
(severe or long-lasting moderate pain, suffering, or distress) (European Parlia
ment, 2010). To best evaluate harm, psychological spheres ofanimals must also
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be considered because inducing fear or anxiety in an animal negatively affects
their well-being (e.g., Council ofEurope, 1979, preamble; Swiss Animal Welfare
Act, 2005, Article 3(b)(4)).
In contrast to harms, benefits are neither classified nor categorized. For
instance, in the UK, where stricter harm-benefit analyses are said to prevail
(Perry, 2007, p. 43), benefits are described in a very broad manner, by answering
questions such as, what data or products may be acquired by the work, what
scientific questions will be answered, what knowledge gaps will be filled, who
will benefit from the work, and how and when the benefits will accrue. Quite
telling in this respect is the need for scientists to " [ e ] xplain why the benefits
go beyond 'it would be nice to know "' (uK Home Office, 2014, p. 126; see also
European Parliament, 2010, Article 38(2)(a); UK Home Office, 2016, pp. 9-11).
Scientifically speaking, to offer benefits, a research project must produce rec
ognizable results of scientific value ( e.g., Austrian Animal Welfare Act, 2004,
Section 4(3)(a)). From a societal perspective, however, only socially desirable
objectives can be pursued in an experiment. Saving labor, time and costs or
duplicating research cannot, prima facie, be weighed against animals' interests
(e.g., German Animal Welfare Act, 2006, Section 7a(2)(5)).
Though these rules on final indispensability serve an important purpose
and help prevent the most unnecessary and atrocious research procedures,
they effectively leave untouched the great bulk of research. For example, the
societal objectives of curing diseases or producing new scientific knowledge
typically operate as a carte blanche that legitimate every form of animal ex
ploitation and give the 3Rs only relative validity. But simply dropping the
words cancer research cannot and should not automatically justify the use of
animals. We must introduce a scheme that evaluates the importance of the
research, its contribution to the expected goal, and the likelihood of its suc
cess; and we must be wary of approving research projects that simply ensure
a research facility's survival and the preservation of jobs, while perpetuating
the exploitation of animals (arguing that "[c] onducting animal experiments
is a convenient and highly effective way for these researchers to gain career
prestige and job security, and for the universities who employ them to obtain
lucrative research grants. There is a quid pro quo relationship between research
institutions and those giving the grants", Greek and Greek, 2004, p.25). No
research that goes beyond "it would be nice to know" is, by itself, morally or
legally weighty enough to justify the immense suffering ofanimals in research.
Peters (2015) proposes categorizing human interests into small, moderate,
and great benefits to introduce a level field for evaluating human benefits
versus animal harms (p. 97). Having precise knowledge about both burdens
and benefits allows us to weigh more systematically the importance of the in
terests at hand, and makes it more obvious when marginal scientific interests
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seek to trump animals' fundamental interests in life and bodily and mental
integrity.
A further failing within harm-benefit evaluations is that the tests are regu
larly affected by referring to the legal tools that encapsulate those interests,
rather than by the interests themselves. Scholars and individuals around the
world have frequently exposed the risks of endowing humans with rights,
while endowing animals only with protections. When experiments are evalu
ated, rights of humans, such as the freedom of research (e.g., Council of Eu
rope, 1950, Article 10) or the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to
engage in work ( e.g., European Convention, 2000, Article 15), are juxtaposed
against (animal) protections (e.g., the 3Rs). The fact that certain interests are
legally recognized either as rights or as protections, establishes a disparate
and unequal footing for the affected parties. Protections are effectively un
dermined when confronted with rights in a balance of interests, because they
are a weaker legal tool. Consequently, protections only take effect where the
rights of humans leave room for them. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005) is
a prime example of this automatic trumping. It requires anyone who handles
animals to ensure their well-being "as far as the intended purpose allows"
(Article 4(1)(b)). This not only renders research quintessentially a utilitarian
endeavor; but, more notably, it creates a structural deficit to the detriment
of animals. The balance of interests ends up being merely perfunctory and
legitimizes, in essence rubber-stamps, the exploitation ofanimals (Ferrari and
Gerritsen, 2015, p. 140; Gerritsen, 2015, p. 38).
A prime example ofthe inherent deficiency created by rights versus protec
tion is the German state objective of animal protection. Prior to the amend
ment of Article 20a of German Basic Law, scholars viewed the German Basic
Law as a "constant obstacle" (Evans, p. 326) to the effective protection ofanimals
and were hopeful that the constitutionalization of animal protection, even
if it would not create justiciable rights, would put animal protection on par
with constitutional rights, as regards governmental value judgments (Gerick,
2005, p. 120). Judiciary practice established since the norm's amendment in
2002, however, shows that the state objective is regularly subordinated to con
stitutional rights (German Administrative Court, 2006; German Constitutional
Court, 2009; German Constitutional Court, 2006; see further Eisen and Stilt,
2017, note 25). The deficiency again is that the balances of interests do not
even examine the interests that underlie legal tools. They fail, for example, to
acknowledge that what we may be balancing are interests in not being tor
tured versus interests in making economic profit. Instead, these tests balance
interests only with reference to legal tools that protect those interests (rights
versus protections)-a practice that structurally favors all human interests in
using animals, over all interests of animals in not being used.
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The first step towards ensuring a less biased balance ofinterests is to clearly
differentiate between a scientific evaluation of whether animals are required
to obtain a scientific result, and an ethical evaluation of whether it is morally
justifiable in each individual case to inflict a certain kind of suffering upon an
animal for a certain kind of desired objective. The second step to reforming
these tests is leveling the position ofcompeting interests, by establishing a reli
able framework for a qualitative and non-speciesist balance of interests. Such
a qualitative balance of interests demands that identical interests be viewed
identically, regardless ofthe holder ofthe interest, i.e., be it the interests ofhu
mans or the interests ofanimals (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, p. 139; Robertson,
2015, p. 102). Balancing qualities of the interests at stake should, in principle,
prevent marginal research interests from trumping interests in bodily integrity.

5

Reform Proposal 3: Animal Rights

5.1

Why Reverse Hierarchies and Upgraded Balances ofInterests Do Not
Suffice
Even if replacement is considered the primary aim of the 3Rs, and even if we
considerably revamp the balance ofinterests test, the 3Rs will likely continue to
fail. The odds against this test are so high because its logic is flawed. The golden
standard in animal experimentation is the animal model. The animal model
poses ethical problems, has never been validated as a research method, and
is strongly criticized for lacking sufficient predictive value to draw inferences
about human models (e.g., Baker, 2016; Bailey, Thew and Balls, 2014; Greek and
Menache, 2013; Knight, 2011; Mcivor, 2019, Chapter 5 in this Volume). Despite
these apparent flaws and the structural deficiencies ofthe animal model, under
the 3Rs, a non-animal model not only needs to be as "effective" as the animal model,
but (unlike the animal model) it actually needs to work. As Greek points out, this
means we are "[w] aiting to abandon a test that does not work until we can
find one that does" (Greek, 2015). A recently published report by the Scien
tific Committee on Health Environmental and Emerging Risks (S C HE E R ) on the
need for non-human primates in research even posits that alternative models,
which are to be validated against existing animal models, will require-from
a legal perspective-using more animals in the validation process ( S C HE E R,
2017, pp. 20, 56). The odds are thus high that the 3Rs will perpetuate the use of
animals in research. A final and crucial lexferenda change that may overturn
this deeply ingrained imbalance requires restructuring protections as rights.

Prohibitions as Rights?
Some scholars argue that animals already have at least some rights by arguing
that prohibitions are negative freedom rights ofanimals. Section 85 paragraph 1
5.2
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of the New Zealand Animal Welfare Act (1999), for example, provides that
"[ n ] o person may carry out any research, testing, or teaching involving the use
ofa non-human hominid unless such use has first been approved by the Direc
tor-General and the research, testing, or teaching is carried out in accordance
with any conditions imposed by the Director-General" (Section 85(1)). From
the general prohibition on using hominids for research, testing, or teaching,
some infer that hominids have the right not to be infringed in their life and
bodily and mental integrity. Wagman and Liebman (2011), for example, argue
that "the ban on certain conduct seems to grant the affected animals the 'right'
to be free ofsuch conduct. Because ofanimals' status as property in every juris
diction, those rights are naturally limited" (pp. 261; see also McCausland, 2014,
p. 27; Robertson, 2015, pp. 3, 5; Sunstein, 2004, p. 99; Waldau, 2011).
If we look at the laws that regulate research on animals, there are several
prohibitions that could be posited as negative freedom rights. According to
Article 8(2) and (3) of Directive 2010/63/EU, there is a prohibition of the use
of great apes and non-human primates for research purposes (cf. European
Parliament, 2010, Recital 18). Exceptions are stated in Article 8(2)(a) and (b) for
non-human primates and in Article 55(2) for great apes. The Australian Policy
on the Use ofNon-Human Primatesfor Scientific Purposes (National Health and
Medical Research Council, 2003), which declares that research on great apes
is legal under narrow conditions, is also sometimes considered to enshrine a
freedom right of great apes to not be used in research. Similar prohibitions/
rights exist in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK,
and other states (Goldner, 2014). Another type ofnegative freedom right can be
seen in the EU-wide prohibition ofexperiments that result in severe pain, suf
fering, or distress for animals and which are likely to be long-lasting (European
Parliament, 2010, Article 15(2)). However, these prohibitions are undermined
when Member States choose to allow such procedures temporarily (Europe
an Parliament, 2010, Article 55(2)-(3)). Member states may, however, decline
to adopt exceptions, which scholars support by arguing that certain levels of
suffering should not be permitted under any circumstances, regardless of any
likely or aspired benefits (Zurlo, Rudacille and Goldberg, 1996). Another type
of prohibition is the ban on subjecting vertebrates to research without anes
thesia when experiments result in serious injuries (European Parliament, 20101
Article 14(1), Sentence 2). Prohibitions may also preclude certain purposes
from justifying animal use in research. Under Puerto Rican law, for example,
animal experiments are prohibited if they are done for educational purposes
(e.g., Puerto Rico Animal Welfare Act, 2008, Article 19(b); see also Swiss Animal
Welfare Ordinance, 2008, Article 138(2)).
Prohibitions are a major step forward for animals, making certain spe
cies of animals unavailable to human disposition. In this sense, prohibitions
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effectively preempt balances of interests: None of the specified procedures
are primafacie available to be overridden by human interests. But these pro
hibitions apply only to a minority of animals (e.g., to iconic or endangered
animals) and continue to be undermined by broad exceptions, which in tum
promote the continuing use of a majority ofanimals in research.
The Needfor Animal Rights
5.3
The whole idea that the duties of some can be translated into the rights of
others (to whom the duty is owed); and, thus, that prohibitions are negative
freedom rights of animals, is disputed in legal scholarship (Curnutt, 2001,
pp. 19ff., 26ff.; Raspe, 2013, p. 282). Contrary to Wagman and Liebman's perspec
tive is the view that specified norms are prohibitions, no more, no less. Rights
are only established by unequivocally identifying them as such (e.g., "hominids
have a right to life and a right to bodily and mental integrity"). Instead of opt
ing for limited prohibitions that are undermined by numerous and sweeping
exceptions, the only way to begin attending to the fundamental interests of
animals is to establish rights for them. Rights are those rare tools that ensure
that interests are qualitatively balanced, and that the balance is egalitarian and
non-speciesist. As Peters (2016) argues: "[ A ] nimal rights would allow a fair bal
ancing in which the proper value offundamental animal interests (such as the
interest to live) could be integrated. Animal rights would therefore preclude
the current routine sacrifice of fundamental animal interests in favor of trite
human interests" (p. 49). The demand for fundamental rights for animals is
neither utopian nor far-fetched; it is the only option available to move away
from our prevailing perfunctory consideration of animals. Particularly in re
search, where balance of interest tests prevail, establishing rights for animals
is indispensable if we seriously want to start envisaging an end to their use in
experimentation.
Another notable aspect about rights is that they ensure that rights holders
have a sphere of absolute unavailability. In human rights law, this is known
as the very substance of a right that may not be restricted or impaired in any
way (e.g., European Economic Community, 1957, Article 2; Swiss Constitution,
1999, Article 36(4)). Because animals, under the laws of most states, are de
nied rights, human interests in exploiting animals take categorical precedence
over their most fundamental interests, such as life and freedom. Introducing
a sphere of inviolability for the most fundamental interests that animals pos
sess is necessary, if we want to truly take their interests seriously and live up to
our recognition of their intrinsic value (Peters, 2015, p. 72). A number of laws
already recognize that the interests of animals matter because these interests
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matter to them, i.e., that animals have to be protected for their own sake. The
Dutch Animal Welfare Act (Wet dieren 2011) in this context expresses "recog
nition of the intrinsic value of the animal" (preamble). Directive 2010/63/EU
(European Parliament, 2010) enshrines that "[ a ] nimals have an intrinsic value
which must be respected" (Recital 10) and that they "should always be treated
as sentient creatures" (Recital 12). The intrinsic value of animals is also recog
nized under German law (German Animal Welfare Act, 2006, Section 1); and
the preamble to the Latvian Animal Protection Law (1999) states that "[t]he
ethical obligation of humankind is to ensure the welfare and protection of all
species of animals, because every unique being is in itself of value". Article 3
litera a of the Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005) speaks of the "[i]nherent worth
ofthe animal that has to be respected". Thailand's Ethical Principles and Guide
linesfor the Use ofAnimals (National Research Council ofThailand, 1999) states
that "[ a ] nimal users are to be aware ofthe value oflife ofanimals" (Principle 1),
and that "animal users need to be aware that animals are living beings just as
humans are living beings" (Principle 4). The recognition of the intrinsic value
ofanimals is not only ethically relevant, but it carries legal implications (Peters,
2015, p. 70) and should result in rights that protect these individuals' core inter
ests. Recent case law in India shows that animal rights are on the rise and that
they are readily implementable. The High Court of Kerala (2000) declared:
"[L] egal rights shall not be the exclusive preserve ofthe humans which has to be
extended beyond people thereby dismantling the thick legal wall with humans
all on one side and all animals on the other side" (N.R. Nair and Ors v. Union
of India (um ) and Ors, 2000); and, "animals are born with an equal claim for
life without any cruelty to them. Perhaps ifthis right was given proper recogni
tion by the human-beings, there would have been no necessity to bring on the
statute book of the said Act" (People for Animals and Ors. v. State of Goa and
Ors, 1997).
Establishing rights, and thereby an essence of inviolability, has a number
of implications. Akin to Principle 5 of the Nuremberg Code (1949), experi
ments will not be conducted, "where there is an a priori reason to believe that
death or disabling injury will occur" because it violates the core content of a
right to life and bodily and mental integrity. And analogous to Principle 8 of
the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013), the primary pur
pose of medical research to generate new knowledge cannot take precedence
over the rights and interests of individual research subjects. Today, the duty
to rehabilitate animals-sometimes known as the fourth R-could be taken
as a useful starting point in this respect. Recital 14 of Directive 2010/63/EU
states that methods should avoid death (of animals) as an endpoint. Killing
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an animal used for a research experiment is only permitted if they remain in
or have recurrent moderate or severe pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm
(European Parliament, 2010, Article 17(2); Government of India, Ministry of
Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6). Article 17 paragraph 3 of Directive
2010/63/EU further states: "Where an animal is to be kept alive, it shall receive
care and accommodation appropriate to its state ofhealth." India's Guidelines
on the Regulation of Scientific Experiments on Animals determine that "investi
gators are responsible for the aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals after
experimentation" ( Government ofIndia, Ministry ofEnvironment and Forests,
2007, Annex 6). If states today are willing to determine that death of animals
used in research should be avoided, it is not unreasonable to consider the pos
sibility that they will grant animals a right to life in the future. Thereby, the
rehoming duty would be explicitly reframed as a manifestation of a right to
life, akin to Principle 5 of the Nuremberg Code (1949). A deficiency of current
rehoming provisions, however, is that researchers are nudged to use the meth
od that causes lasting moderate and severe pain, so they can put the animal
down without having to care for or accommodate them after the conclusion
of the experiment. To counter these unwarranted disincentives, the costs of
aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals post-experimentation should be
budgeted as a part of research costs when an application is filed (as required
by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6,
Principle 4).
5.4
A Paradigm Shift?
Animal rights implemented in law would create a paradigm shift because
they offer specific advantages over protections. Instead of merely establish
ing specific and context-dependent prohibitions, rights operate more broadly
and are less determinate. This confers advantages to the rights holder, because
rights are applicable in a myriad of situations. For example, a right to bodi
ly and mental integrity applies to the general question of whether use of an
animal in research is justified. If the answer is yes, then the question must be
asked whether and how this right can be guaranteed in research (e.g., by car
rying out research that does not inflict any form of suffering, including death).
Moreover, animals are empowered by rights because they, by being actionable,
grant them access to stronger legal tools of enforcement (Edmundson, 20141
pp. 345ff., 350; Goldner, 2014, p. 53ff.). Only the enforced duty of others to re
spect the right in question renders its worthiness palpable (Edmundson, 2014,
p. 360). Establishing a right of animals to life and bodily and mental integrity
would stop perpetuating the use ofanimals for research and enable us to achi
eve the primary goal of the 3Rs: the ultimate replacement of animal models.
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While funding animal-free alternatives will undoubtedly contribute to this
goal, as well (see e.g., Swiss Animal Welfare Act, Article 22( 2 ) ; European Par
liament, 2010, Recital 46 ) , only a paradigm change in the law of animals in
research will stop incentivizing research facilities to continue experiment
ing on animals and will start enabling them to put all their efforts into find
ing ethically sound (and more scientifically sound) alternatives to the use of
animals.
If industries cannot now devise alternatives to animal models, then certain
types of research procedures simply should not be carried out until we find
alternatives. When the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013)
came into force, legislators deemed acceptable the burden of looking for al
ternative models to research on humans. The same change of research pro
cedure is, on the basis of a non-speciesist ethic, reasonable to demand from
industries that currently rely on animal models. This route is not utopian but
was taken by lawmakers before, such as when the Eu decided to give full ef
fect to the Cosmetics Directive (European Commission, 2013, p. 3 ) . When dis
cussing the potential postponement of the 2013 marketing ban on cosmetics,
since replacement methods for all animal models were not yet available, the
EC argued that postponing the ban would "diminish determination to swiftly
develop alternative test methods. Past experience demonstrates clearly that
animal testing provisions in the cosmetics legislation have been a key accel
erator in relation to the development of alternative methods and have sent
a strong signal far beyond the cosmetics sector and far beyond Europe" (Eu
ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6). Instead of conceiving rights for animals as a
scientific regression, industries will be incentivized to finally spur innovation
towards ethically sound and economically accessible alternatives.
The E u Cosmetics Directive has had a positive spill-over effect into other ar
eas of animal experimentation, alongside further national bans on cosmetics
testing, including Australia (Australian Government, Department of Health,
2018) , India ( Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
2005, Section 148C), Israel (Israeli Cruelty to Animals Law 1994, Article 2( d);
prohibiting cutting into live tissue), Guatemala (Guatemalan Animal Welfare
Act 2017, Article 54), New Zealand (New Zealand Animal Welfare Act 1999,
Section 84A), South Korea (South Korea Animal Protection Law 2007; in force
2019 ), and Taiwan (Business Cosmetics, 2016 ) . In September 2016, the Dutch
parliament changed its policy on animal research law in an unprecedented
way. The parliament passed a motion to phase out all experiments on non
human primates and declared that by 2025, it aims to operate by testing meth
ods that do not make use of animals. The policy areas in which the use of
animals must be phased out until 2025 include regulatory testing ofchemicals,
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food ingredients, pesticides and (veterinary) medicines and biological prod
ucts, such as vaccines. In the areas of fundamental research, applied and
transitional research, as well as education and training, by contrast, no such
specific reference date has been announced. The government's next step is for
the Dutch National Committee for the Protection ofAnimals Used for Scien
tific Purposes (NCad, 2016) to plan a schedule that phases out experiments on
animals (which applies to all of the above areas). NCad clearly puts emphasis
on innovation and the development of new research methods rather than the
abrogation of animal research; yet, its move is historical and will hopefully set
a precedent for other states to follow. These developments show that the un
availability of animals for research does not equate with an end to research
and advances for human benefit but instead, it heralds the beginning of an
ethically and scientifically sound future for research. If devised as rights in
stead ofbans, these regulatory changes would create more secure and justicia
ble ground for animals and could enable us to work more effectively towards a
paradigm change in research.

6

Concluding Remarks

The 3Rs are a primary example of regulatory failure, and yet the concept
enjoys an unparalleled acceptance among states and research institutions
worldwide. Instead of abrogating the 3Rs (which is demanded by a grow
ing number of citizens), it would be better to leverage the 3Rs' widespread
acceptance to enable regulators to fulfil their unachieved regulatory goals
and meet the growing demands of citizens for a more just relationship with
animals.
This chapter proposed means of bringing about paradigm change, that, al
though few, are powerful. First, regulators must reverse the hierarchy of the
3Rs, based on a historical, teleological, and evolutionary interpretation, with
replacement taking precedence. Second, regulators must introduce qualitative
balances ofinterests, so identical interests are viewed identically, regardless of
the interest holder. As a result, marginal scientific or prestige interests cannot
trump interests in life and bodily and mental integrity. Third, animals must be
accorded explicit rights to life and bodily and mental integrity, based on our
legal commitment to protect them for their own sake (intrinsic animal pro
tection), for the following reasons: rights grant more power to rights holders
than interests do to interest holders, rights require special justification, give
effective weight to animal interests in balancing tests, make the core interests
of animals inviolable to human exploitation, and operate broadly. Although
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rights will preclude undertaking many research practices that are currently
conducted on animals, they spur innovation and help make research more ef
fective and accessible. As the EC (2013) stated with respect to cosmetics, "the
possible risks from the 2013 marketing ban can be turned into an opportunity
for the Union to set an example of responsible innovation [ ... ] with positive
impact beyond Europe" (p. 6). The very same opportunities are available to us
in research more generally if we begin to embark on a road of innovation and
progress.
If these adjustments are incorporated, we anticipate that the 3Rs can of
fer a valuable approach to overturning the deeply ingrained default rule of
animal experimentation and to incrementally phase out the use of animals
in research. But "[f]ully reaping the potential of alternative methods is a
challenging endeavor that will require a shift in thinking of all involved" (Eu
ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6; inertia of continued animal use is acknowl
edged in Innovate UK, 2015, p. 14). Legislators must empower scientists and
research institutions to take the full replacement road by designing the best
possible legal framework for it and by giving them the necessary financial in
centives and education to pursue replacement, instead of holding them mor
ally responsible for the continued use of animals, which is in fact a regulatory
failure.
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